The theory of optimal insurance with noninsurable background risk has previously been examined under the assumption that the background risk and insurable loss random variables are additively separable within the agent's utility function. In this study, these two variables are nonseparable because marginal insurable loss is positively dependent on the outcome of the background risk variable. This positive dependence implies that background risk has a smaller marginal impact on profits at higher levels of insurable loss. The optimal contract is shown to require coinsurance above a deductible minimum when the agent is prudent. This result is opposite Gollier's (1996) finding that a "disappearing deductible" is optimal when a higher level of insurable loss implies a more risky distribution of the background risk variable. With relatively weak restrictions on the various functions, the optimal indemnity schedule is a convex function of loss and the slope of this function is inversely related to certainty income.
INTRODUCTION
One of the most important results in the economics of insurance literature was established by Arrow (1971 Arrow ( , 1974 . He showed that if the premium rate set by a risk-neutral insurance company depends only on the actuarial value of the policy, then the optimal form of the policy for a risk-averse expected utility maximizer is 100 percent coverage above a deductible minimum.
1 Raviv (1979) analyzed the problem with a more general set of assumptions and found that Arrow's result holds when there exist multiple insurable risks. As well, if the insurance supplier is risk averse, or if the cost of supplying insurance services is a convex function of the level of indemnities, then the optimal insurance policy generally entails coinsurance rather than 100 percent coverage above James Vercammen is an associate professor on the Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, and visiting professor on the Faculty of Economics and Commerce at the University of Melbourne, Australia. Funding from the Faculty of Economics and Commerce at the University of Melbourne is gratefully acknowledged. 1 Gollier (1991) discusses Arrow's findings in the context of a more general theory of risk sharing. Gollier and Schlesinger (1996) show that Arrow's basic result also holds when risk attitudes are defined by the more broad concept of second-order stochastic dominance. a deductible. 2 Raviv's analysis also confirmed the well-known result that a deductible is optimal only if the cost of supplying the insurance service depends on the level of coverage.
An important extension of these results involves determining the optimal insurance contract when insurance markets are incomplete because one or more risks are noninsurable (see Doherty, 1985, and Borch, 1990 , for a general discussion of these markets). In one strand of literature, insured agents are allowed to choose a coverage fraction, a, such that if the loss is L, then the indemnity payment is aL. Using a discrete price model, Doherty and Schlesinger (1983) showed that a = 1 is generally not optimal if the insurable and noninsurable risk variables are statistically dependent. In general, the two sources of risk must be independent for full coverage to be optimal (see, e.g., Eeckhoudt and Kimball, 1991, and Hau, 1999) . In a second strand of literature, the insurance contract consists of a continuous schedule above a minimum deductible rather than a single scalar (Gollier, 1987 , Gollier and Schlesinger, 1995 . If the loss variable is x and the deductible is a scalar x 0 ³0, then in Arrow's case the indemnity schedule has the form I(x) = Max[0, x -x 0 ] and, with more general assumptions, I(x) is nonlinear with a slope that can either be greater than or less than unity.
One of the main results from this literature is that Arrow's 100 percent coverage above a deductible minimum result holds if the insurable and noninsurable risk variables are additively separable and independent. Gollier (1996) shows that if the two sources of risk are dependent such that a higher level of insurable loss implies a more risky distribution of the background risk variable, then the 100 percent coverage result no longer holds. Instead, if the agent is prudent then I'(x) > 1 such that x -I(x) is decreasing in x (i.e., the deductible is "disappearing").
3 Gollier (1996) also shows that I(x) > 0 if x > 0 (i.e., there is no deductible) if the premium rate is fair, regardless of whether the two sources of risk are independent or dependent. For the case of independent risk and costly insurance, the deductible is positive and, with reasonable restrictions on the utility function, is lower with higher levels of background risk.
In this article, a different relationship between the insurable loss and background risk variables is assumed. Rather than working with a pair of variables that are additively separable and correlated in a particular way as in Gollier (1996) , a bivariate loss function with a nonzero cross-partial derivative is specified and the two sources of uncertainty are assumed independent. The current specification of the stochastic processes can always be converted to Gollier's separable/correlated risk specification and vice versa with various mathematical transformations. The current model should therefore be viewed as an alternative and sometimes more convenient way to specify the general problem of optimal insurance with background risk. The analysis also highlights that statistical independence of background risk and insurable loss is not sufficient to ensure the standard 100 percent coverage result.
The following three examples illustrate why the nonseparability framework is likely to be useful in some situations. A racehorse breeder may insure a colt against acci-dents such as a broken leg. The uninsurable risk is that the breeder does not know whether the horse will turn out to be moderately or highly valuable for genetic reasons alone. The marginal economic loss from a more severe accident is higher the greater the genetic-based potential of the colt is. A farmer insures his or her crop against hail damage. When insurance is purchased, the farmer does not know whether rains will be plentiful and the yield (without hail damage) will be high or whether low yields because of a shortfall of moisture will occur. The marginal economic loss from the hail is greater in high rainfall years than in low rainfall years. A firm may insure its inventory of material inputs against fire damage. The value of those inputs (in the absence of fire damage) is initially unknown because it depends on the eventual selling price of the manufactured items. The marginal loss from the fire damage is higher when the selling price of the manufactured goods turns out to be high rather than low.
The optimal indemnity schedule in the current analysis is quite different than that derived by Gollier (1996) . Rather than the optimal policy requiring a disappearing deductible for a prudent agent, coinsurance is optimal. Coinsurance and a disappearing deductible are opposite outcomes because, in the former case, the rate of indemnification is less than marginal expected loss, and in the latter case indemnification exceeds marginal loss. The reason for the difference in these results is discussed later in the article.
With relatively weak restrictions placed on the agent's utility function and the bivariate loss function, the rate of indemnification increases relative to the expected rate of loss (i.e., the degree of coinsurance decreases) for higher levels of loss. Similarly, for a common class of utility functions, the optimal rate of indemnification is lower with lower levels of certainty income (e.g., a rise in the premium rate). The effect of the background risk on the optimal size of the deductible is complex and is not analyzed in this study because the slope of the indemnity schedule depends in a complex way on both the size of the premium and the size of the deductible, and the optimal deductible depends on both the slope of the indemnity schedule and the premium rate. Gollier (1996) does not examine the effect of background risk on the optimal deductible when background risk and insurable loss are correlated and insurance is costly.
In the next section, the assumptions of the model are specified and the basic model is developed. The slope and curvature properties of the optimal indemnity schedule above an arbitrarily specified deductible are examined in the third section. In the fourth section, a simple numerical example involving log utility and uniformly distributed disturbance variables illustrates that the coinsurance effects are not likely to be trivial. Concluding comments are contained in the last section.
ASSUMPTIONS AND THE MODEL
The insurance buyer faces random end of period revenue p(y, x), where y Î [a, b] with b > a and x Î [0, T] with T > 0 are independent random variables and p(y, x) is a continuously differentiable function. The probability density function for y is denoted g(y) and the analogous function for x is denoted h(x). The respective cumulative density functions are denoted G(y) and H(x). Revenue is strictly increasing in the noninsurable background risk variable, y, and is strictly decreasing in the insurable loss variable, x. That is, p y (y, x) > 0 and p x (y, x) < 0 for all y Î [a, b] and all x Î [0, T]. As well, p xy (y, x) < 0, implying that marginal insurable loss is larger for better outcomes of the background risk variable. Let M(y) º p(y, 0) denote the level of revenue when there is no insurable loss. Now define L(y, x) = M(y) -p(y, x) as the loss in revenue resulting from x > 0. Clearly, L y < 0, L x > 0, and L yx > 0 given the above assumptions about p(y, x).
Assume that indemnities can be conditioned on x but not on both y and x (or, equivalently, L). 4 Let I(x) denote an arbitrary indemnity schedule and I * (x) denote the optimal indemnity schedule, which is derived below. Let P denote the price of the insurance, commonly referred to as the premium. The insured agent's random net wealth, denoted W, for a particular indemnity schedule and premium can be ex-
The agent is assumed to be risk averse and maximizes a continuous and fully differentiable expected utility function, U(W), where U¢(W) > 0 and U²(W) < 0. That is, the insured agent purchases insurance to maximize
where E denotes the expectation operator.
The company supplying the insurance is assumed to be risk neutral and sets a premium that is proportional to expected indemnities. That is,
where g = 1 represents an actuarially fair insurance policy and g > 1 implies costly insurance. Assuming that the premium rate is proportional to expected indemnities greatly simplifies the analysis because all links between the slope of the indemnity schedule and the curvature of the insurance cost function are eliminated. 5 The problem at hand is to derive the form of the indemnity schedule, I(x), which maximizes Equation (1) subject to Equation (2) and the restriction that I(x) ³ 0. 6 The standard approach is to derive in stage one the indemnity schedule for a fixed value of P and for x above the deductible and to then solve in stage two for the optimal values of P and the deductible. As indicated above, the focus of this analysis is on the slope and curvature properties of the indemnity schedule and thus stage two is omitted.
Following the approach of Raviv (1979) , the problem is solved using optimal control theory. Let I(x) be the control variable and
Ix hxd x be the state 4 If indemnities could be conditioned on both y and x, then the problem would reduce to deriving the optimal policy for the case of multiple loss, as examined by Raviv (1979) . 5 As indicated earlier, Raviv (1979) showed that, without background risk, coinsurance is optimal if the insurance cost function is convex. 6 Gollier (1987) examines the implications of relaxing the I(x) > 0 constraint. It could also be argued that restrictions on upper values of I(x) should be imposed to deal with moral hazard issues. A racehorse owner, for example, will have an incentive to be less careful when attempting to prevent injuries to a particular racehorse if the owner has discovered that the horse is below average quality. Such considerations, while important, are not addressed in this study.
variable. It follows that z(0) = z(T) = 0 and
The Hamiltonian for this problem can be written as
The co-state variable, l, is constant within Equation (3) because the Hamiltonian does not depend on the state variable. Thus, the necessary conditions for the optimal form of the control variable, I(x), subject to the nonnegativity constraint, I(x) ³ 0, are
and
Equation (4) is increasing in x because L(x) > 0 and U² < 0. Thus, there may exist a range of values, x Î [0, x 0 ] where x 0 ³ 0, such that Equation (4) takes on a nonpositive value, in which case I*(x) = 0 is optimal. As x increases beyond x 0 , Equation (4) takes on a strictly positive value and then it is necessary to choose I*(x) > 0 such that Equation (5) holds with equality. The variable x 0 is referred to as the deductible. Equations (4) and (5) are also sufficient conditions for the optimal solution because the utility function is assumed strictly concave in the control variable.
MARGINAL INDEMNITY SCHEDULE
Of interest in this section are the properties of the marginal indemnity schedule, I * ¢(x), for the range of x where I * (x) > 0. In conventional analysis, L(y, x) = x -y and thus the marginal loss is constant and equal to one. In this study, rather than comparing marginal indemnities to a deterministic marginal loss of one, it is necessary to compare marginal indemnities and the expected marginal loss, which will generally not equal one. Let
L y x g y dy denote the expected (conditional) loss function. The marginal expected loss function, L * ¢(x), can be expressed as
The marginal indemnity schedule, for the range of I * (x) where I * (x) > 0, is obtained by totally differentiating Equation (5) 
where W * º W when I(x) º I * (x) . Given the assumptions that L x > 0 and U²(A) < 0, it follows immediately from Equation (7) that I * ¢(x) > 0. Dividing Equation (7) by Equation (6) 
To be even more revealing, Equation (8) can be written as
where COV refers to the covariance operator, for this case with respect to y.
The first major result of the analysis can now be stated. Kimball, 1990) , then
Proposition 1: If the agent is "prudent" such that U¢¢¢ > 0 (
Proof: W is increasing in y and U² is increasing in W if U²¢> 0. Therefore, y and U² are positively correlated. The function L x (y, x) is also increasing in y because L xy > 0 by assumption. Therefore, L x and U² are positively correlated. Proposition 1 follows because the denominator of Equation (9) takes on a negative value. Q.E.D.
Proposition 1 reveals that, for the prudent agent, marginal indemnities are less than the expected marginal loss. In other words, the optimal policy requires coinsurance above a deductible minimum. It is easy to establish for the opposite case of U¢¢¢ < 0 that marginal indemnities exceed expected marginal loss, implying that the optimal contract has a "disappearing deductible" as in Gollier (1996) . Only when U¢¢¢ = 0 does the standard result emerge: full coverage above a deductible minimum is optimal. Similarly, if L xy < 0 (i.e., a higher outcome for the background risk variable results in lower insurable loss), then the disappearing deductible result will also emerge. Proposition 1 is expected given Gollier's (1996) analysis because in his model a higher level of loss results in more background risk and in the current model a higher level of loss results in a lower marginal impact of background risk on profits.
The intuition of Proposition 1 is as follows. Optimal insurance involves equating expected marginal utility (where expectations are taken with respect to y) across the range of values of x for which I * (x) > 0. When the agent is prudent, U¢¢¢ > 0 and thus marginal utility, U¢, is downward sloping and convex to the origin. Prudence implies that wealth is more valuable in states where the background risk is larger because as risk increases expected marginal utility rises because of the convexity of U¢. With the assumption that L xy > 0, the impact of background risk is lower as insurable loss increases and thus a prudent agent is less willing to obtain a larger indemnity in states with a larger loss. Hence, Proposition 1 follows. In the model of Gollier (1996) , marginal indemnities exceed expected marginal loss because a higher loss implies more background risk and thus higher expected marginal utility when U¢¢¢ > 0.
The next result deals with how I * ¢(x)/L¢(x) changes with x. 
where
From Proposition 1 and its associated proof, it follows that
These results, together with restriction (i), are sufficient to assign a positive value to Equation (10). Q.E.D.
The last two sufficiency conditions contained in Proposition 2 are relatively weak because they involve high-order derivative expressions. The first restriction, L xx ³ 0, is reasonable in many situations because it implies that marginal insurable loss is either constant or increasing in x. The implication of Propositions 1 and 2 together is that the rate of indemnification increases toward the rate of loss as the level of loss increases. Equivalently, this result implies that the degree of co-insurance diminishes as the level of loss increases. With the L xx ³ 0 restriction, L * ¢(x) is a constant or is increasing and thus Proposition 2 implies that the indemnity schedule is convex.
It is also useful to determine how a change in the level of the agent's certainty income (e.g., an increase in the premium rate) affects the optimal rate of indemnification relative to the expected rate of loss. The expected rate of loss does not depend on P and thus it is sufficient to examine the impact of P on I * ¢(x). The specific result is summarized in the following proposition. Proof: After replacing the integrals with the expectations operator (expectations are taken with respect to y), the derivative of Equation (7) with respect to P can be written as
( 1 1 ) With U¢¢¢ > 0 the sign of Equation (11) 
( , ) ( , )
by L x (y*, x) = z and expectations are now taken with respect to the newly defined random variable, z. Note that W ** is increasing in z because L y < 0 and L xy > 0 by assumption and (y, x) . With U¢¢¢ > 0, U² is increasing in W ** . Equation (12) therefore holds if U² is increasing in W ** more rapidly than U¢¢¢ is increasing in W ** because a more rapid rate of increase implies that zU is relatively more convex than zU¢¢¢. Consequently, sufficient conditions for a negative value for Equation (11) are that U¢¢¢ > 0 and -U¢¢¢/U² is decreasing in W ** . Q.E.D.
The second sufficiency condition in Proposition 3 is a reasonable restriction to impose on the utility function. Both conditions hold for common utility functions such as power utility and log utility. With exponential utility (i.e., constant absolute risk aversion), -U¢¢¢/U² is a constant and thus the slope of the indemnity schedule is not affected by changes in certainty income. Because of the I * (x 0 ) = 0 restriction, an immediate implication of Proposition 3 is that the entire indemnity schedule shifts down if there is a decrease in certainty income (e.g., a rise in the premium rate). A decrease in certainty income increases the covariance between L x and U² and, as discussed below Proposition 1, it is the covariance between L x and U² that induces the agent to reduce the rate of indemnification relative to the expected rate of loss. 
AN EXAMPLE
Background risk can be integrated out of this function:
The equivalent of Equation (5) is obtained by differentiating Equation (14) with respect to I and setting the derivative equal to gl. After some rearranging, the resulting expression can be written as
Equation (15) shows the optimal indemnity schedule above x = x 0 . This equation, together with the boundary condition I * (x 0 ) = 0, implies that
Equation (16) can be substituted into Equation (15) to obtain the indemnity schedule for x > x 0 .
For simulation purposes, suppose the premium rate is fair, implying that g = 1, and also suppose that x 0 = 0. In other words, suppose the standard result that the optimal deductible is zero when the insurance is fair holds. Equation (2) can now be used to calculate the equilibrium value of P. An analytical solution for P cannot be found so numerical integration techniques must be used. Assume that W 0 = 0.5 and s = 0.75, implying a comparatively low level of initial wealth and moderately high level of background risk. The expected loss schedule and the optimal indemnity schedule are plotted in Figure 1 . Notice how background risk introduces a significant degree of coinsurance. Notice also that the indemnity schedule is convex because the slope increases from 0.38 at x = 0 to 0.50 at x = 1. These two results are expected given Propositions 1 and 2. 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Most insurance situations involve some level of background risk and the interaction between the insurable risk and noninsurable background risk can interact in a variety of ways. In this study, it is assumed that the marginal loss from a mishap depends positively on the outcome of a stochastic noninsurable event (e.g., for a given level of hail, more rainfall results in a higher crop yield, so the marginal insurable loss from hail damage rises with noninsurable rainfall). With this assumption, it is shown that optimal insurance requires coinsurance for all levels of loss above a deductible minimum. In previous studies that consider deductible contracts, the only justification for coinsurance is risk aversion for the insurance supplier or convex indemnification costs. The coinsurance result is in direct contrast to Gollier's (1996) disappearing deductible result, which arises when the distribution for the background risk variable becomes more risky at higher levels of insurable loss.
The simulation results, which are based on a log utility function and a simple multiplicative bivariate loss function, are obviously highly specialized. Nevertheless, because there is a significant degree of coinsurance in this arbitrarily chosen case, the optimal level of coinsurance in a real-world insurance situation is not likely to be trivial. In many insurance situations (e.g., home and auto), the focus of insurance demand is on the size of the deductible and few options exist for agents to vary the rate of indemnification. The disappearing deductible result of Gollier (1996) and the current results suggest that offering clients insurance contracts with varying rates of indemnification should be considered.
